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Once a country allergic to any type of preferential treatment or quota measure for women,
France has become a country that applies gender quotas to regulate women’s presence and
representation in politics, the business sector, public bodies, public administration, and even
some civil society organizations. While research has concentrated on the adoption of
electoral gender quotas in many countries and their international diffusion, few studies focus
on explaining the successful diffusion of gender quotas from politics to other domains in the
same country. This paper proposes to ﬁll this gap by studying the particularly puzzling case
of a country that at one point strongly opposed the adoption of gender quotas in politics,
but, in less than a decade, transformed into one of the few countries applying gender quotas
across several policy domains. This paper argues that the legal entrenchment of the parity
principle, the institutionalization of parity in several successive women’s policy agencies,
and key players in these newly created agencies are mainly responsible for this unexpected
development. The diffusion of gender quotas in France thus offers an illuminating example
of under which conditions women’s policy agencies can act autonomously to diffuse and
impose a new tool for gender equality.
Keywords:women policy agency; support structure; electoral quotas; corporate boards quotas;
public bodies quotas
Introduction
Once a country allergic to any policy that would look like afﬁrmative action for women or any
other social group, let alone quotas with ﬁxed targets,1 France has transformed in a decade and
a half (1999–2014) into the land of gender quotas. Since the adoption of the last round of
gender equality measures under the socialist government and parliamentary majority,2 gender
quotas are now implemented in universities’ juries, for hospitals’ and other public institutions’
higher civil servant categories, ministries’ staffs, corporate boards of medium and large ﬁrms,
supervisory boards of public institutions, professional organizations, sports federations, regional
socio-economic councils and, last but not least, most elected political bodies. How has such a
change been made possible?
When the debate on gender parity in politics appeared on the French public scene in the mid-
1990s, the word “quota” itself was taboo. Activists went to great lengths to deny accusation of
special treatment for women or of afﬁrmative action3 and the very idea of a target to attain
was dismissed as un-Republican, un-French, and contradictory with the principle of equality.
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Today, the picture is quite the opposite. In successive waves of legal reforms, the French Parlia-
ment has adopted numerous measures that use speciﬁc targets (in general a 40% quota) to impose
women’s presence in many decision-making bodies or functions that organize social, economic,
and political life. This drastic reversal was not achieved without a ﬁght. Many on the right wing of
the political landscape, and some on the left-wing, as well as representatives of the business sector
tried to resist the diffusion of gender-quota mechanisms in social and economic life in the mid-
2000s. However, the ﬁght was more easily won this time around: the epic struggle for political
parity that took place in 1999 and 2000 had deﬁnitely shaken and shifted the ground upon
which political and social actors had to ﬁght subsequently.
This paper retraces the process by which France has become one of the most gender-quota-
friendly countries in Europe, and the factors that account for this unlikely outcome. I document
how a concept once contentious in the French public sphere has become unproblematic and
widely used to solve gender equality issues. Furthermore, I explore the factors that might
account for this phenomenon. I show that the institutionalization of parity in several governmental
and parliamentary bodies prevented backlash once the ﬁrst parity reform was enacted, and further
made possible the adoption and appropriation of the concept of parity/gender quotas by the
French bureaucracy and political institutions and its subsequent diffusion to other policy
domains. I argue that the rationales justifying parity, which triggered a normative shift about
gender quotas, the legal entrenchment of gender quotas and the institutionalization of parity in
the French governmental bureaucracy, created what I call, following Epp (1998), a support struc-
ture in favor of gender quotas. This support structure explains why gender quotas have become
routinized – they are now presented as the preferred tool to address most issues relating to gender
inequalities – and that their adoption in many ﬁelds of public policy has become endogenous
rather than imposed by outside activist or international normative pressure.4
Explaining entrenchment and diffusion of gender quotas across policy domains
While a lot of scholarly attention has been focused on quota adoption and the factors that might
prevent it or help it (e.g., Krook 2009; Meier 2012; Murray, Krook, and Opello 2012; see Praud
2012 for a review) or on gender quotas’ impact (e.g., Franceschet and Piscopo 2008; Franceschet,
Krook, and Piscopo 2011), less attention has been paid to the life quota legislations live after they
are adopted and whether they are expanded, restricted or transformed (for an exception, see Meier
2014). However, with gender quotas now having been in place in many countries for more than
two or three decades, and with no less than three major domains to which they apply – politics,
economy/corporate sector and public bodies – the question of how quota legislations unfold, if
and how they are translated and imported to other domains of public policy, draws attention to
a new ﬁeld of investigation and to other factors and processes than the ones that might have
explained quota adoption in the ﬁrst place.
Indeed, the literature on quota adoption has emphasized the role played by women’s move-
ments mobilizing for quotas and their ties with female politicians or insiders (Giraud and
Jenson 2001; Baldez 2004; Scott 2005; Lépinard 2007 AQ1
¶
; Krook 2009; Meier 2012), the importance
of the political opportunity structure, including the support of left-wing political parties and gov-
ernments and political competition among parties (Caul 2001; Meier 2004; Murray 2010), the
inﬂuence of citizenship regimes and normative conceptions of equality (Krook, Lovenduski,
and Squires 2006; Lépinard 2006; Meier 2012) and the instrumental role of transnational
network and/or European and international institutions (Dauhpin and Praud 2002; Krook 2006;
Bereni 2007 AQ2
¶
). Hence, research on quota adoption tends to focus on the external pressure a
coalition of actresses put on the political elite to adopt quotas and on the role that national
allies – such as Courts or left-wing political parties – and international norms play in the
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process. However, while quota adoption tends to raise many normative debates in the public
sphere and often attracts a lot of public attention, this might not be the case with quota diffusion
to other policy domains. Moreover, while quota adoption might necessitate a constitutional revi-
sion, and therefore elicit legal controversy and opposition, quota diffusion to other policy domains
might imply a much smoother process and less opposition from courts.
Hence, the study of quota entrenchment and diffusion can complement and nuance research
on quota adoption. Entrenchment refers to the strengthening of the legal tools adopted to
implement quotas in electoral politics (placement mandates, higher ﬁnes, constitutional revisions
to legalize quotas), whereas diffusion refers to the adoption of gender-quota mechanisms in other
spheres than electoral politics. Although the legislature must adopt each new gender quota, I use
the term diffusion rather than use adoption, because, as the time lapse between each new adoption
suggests, a mechanism of diffusion and processes of learning are at stake.
Despite the fact that scholars have noted the diffusion of quotas to various policy domains, even
identifying a sequence speciﬁc to Nordic countries with three “generations” of quotas – electoral,
public bodies quotas, and corporate sector quotas (Holli 2011) – and have suggested that gender
quotas adopted in different domains tend to share similar rationales and follow a similar logic as
the experience gained in one domain of public policy is exported to a new domain with increased
legitimacy (see Meier 2014 on Belgium), little attention has so far been devoted to analyze the
factors, the mechanisms, and the entrepreneurs of quota diffusion. The analysis of the French
case proposed here aims at further exploring quota entrenchment and diffusion across domains
using insights from three strands in current research: the literature on policy transfer and diffusion,
and the literature on women policy agencies (WPAs).
The now vast literature on policy transfer (e.g., Dolowitz and Marsh 1996, 2000) and policy
diffusion (see Maggetti and Gilardi 2015 for a review) focuses on the complex political dynamics
by which elements of public policies are transferred between units; or, as analysts of diffusion put
it, how the policies of one unit are inﬂuenced by the policies of other units (Gilardi 2010 AQ3
¶
). Mech-
anisms identiﬁed by the diffusion literature focus on the behavior of actors understood as free-
standing individual units with rational motivations (learning, emulation, or competition) which
drive diffusion, whereas the older literature on policy transfer tended to insist more on institutions
and public policy mechanisms. From the literature on policy transfer, I retain two main insights
for the analysis of gender quotas diffusion: the role of policy entrepreneurs in transferring knowl-
edge and policy tools, and the identiﬁcation of factors enabling transfer such as the simplicity of
the policy tool, its direct relationship to the problem to be solved and its predictability in terms of
outcomes (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996). Indeed, as will become evident in the following sections,
key actors contributing to diffusing quotas from the political realm to the economic and social
spheres and the perceived simplicity, efﬁcacy, and predictability of gender quotas have made
them preferred tools for feminist policy-makers.
The literature on WPAs provides yet another insight to study quota diffusion. Indeed, the lit-
erature on state feminism underscores how WPAs might relay women’s movements’ claims,
thereby gendering public policy debates and outcomes (e.g., Stetson and Mazur 1995, 2000;
Lovenduski 2005). It is therefore important to incorporate into the analysis the role of state insti-
tutions (Franceschet and Piscopo 2013; Piscopo 2015), especially at the stage of entrenchment
and policy diffusion. Indeed, at this stage, WPAs might act more autonomously, and may be
much more instrumental in getting new legislation passed without external activists’ support.
For example, research on WPAs suggests that for policy domains that are well institutionalized
with permanent networks and institutions inside the state, WPAs constitute a crucial actor to
prevent backlash and preserve feminist gains in times of retrenchment (McBride and Mazur
2010). Gender-quota diffusion in France therefore offers a particularly interesting case to
explore the autonomous role WPAs might play in shaping public policy. In particular, as
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I show in the next sections, the institutionalization of the parity claim in successive governmental
bodies dedicated to gender equality or parity was instrumental in helping to prevent backlash
against parity in electoral politics and in supporting the diffusion of gender quotas to other
domains. I argue that these WPAs dedicated to supporting the entrenchment of parity were all
the more successful in their task, because the principle of parity was constitutionally enshrined,
providing an important legal tool to reframe demands for gender equality. Taken together, the
legal provisions entrenching parity and the WPAs in charge of monitoring its implementation con-
stitute what Charles Epp, in his analysis of the “rights revolution” (Epp 1998) has called a
“support structure” enabling the entrenchment and the diffusion of gender quotas.
This analysis is based on extensive qualitative ﬁeldwork: complete analysis of all the parlia-
mentary and constitutional debates and parliamentary reports involving gender quota measures
between 1982 and 2014 which cover electoral quotas, corporate board quotas (CBQs), public
administration quotas, and public bodies quotas; reports from WPAs on gender quotas during
the same period issued by the Observatory of Parity, the parliamentary delegations for
women’s rights, and the High Council for equality between women and men; and seven semi-
directive interviews with key players in WPAs and NGOs in favor of parity made in June 2014.
Breaking the rules, shifting the normative and legal ground: adopting electoral parity
The story of gender quotas in France goes back several decades and is full of unexpected devel-
opments, surprising twists, and epic battles. However, what is striking is that since 1982, when the
ﬁrst gender quota bill was introduced, the normative, legal, and political grounds upon which
social and political actors debate this issue has radically shifted. The initial deeply rooted resist-
ance to quotas expressed by the political and judicial elite and constitutional judges has faded
away. Highly principled arguments against quotas, invoking the indivisibility of the Republic
and the legal deﬁnition of equality and democratic freedom have disappeared and left room for
more pragmatic assessments about the need to improve women’s presence in decision-making
bodies in all spheres of social life. In this section, I retrace brieﬂy the history of quota adoption
in France and I document the normative, legal, and political shift that has occurred as new gender
quota provisions have become legitimized and much more easily adopted – even under right-wing
legislature – than when parity ﬁrst appeared on the French political scene.
The history of the adoption of electoral gender quotas in France is now well documented
(Bereni and Lépinard 2004; Baudino 2005; Scott 2005; Opello 2006 AQ4
¶
; Rosenblum 2006; Lépinard
2007; Krook 2009; Murray 2010). The initial 1982 decision of the French Constitutional Council
to declare unconstitutional the provision of a bill proposing a 25% quota of women on candidate
lists for municipal elections5 framed the subsequent public debate on this issue for two decades.
Indeed, the Constitutional Council (hereafter CC) argued its refusal of gender quotas on highly
principled grounds invoking two constitutional principles: the indivisibility of the sovereignty
of the people and the equality principle. The use of a quota was perceived as dividing the
people into different groups (men and women) and therefore incompatible with the idea that
the French people is undividable and exercises its sovereignty through its representatives in a
non-divided way. Second, the quota was perceived as contradicting the principle of (formal)
equality that applies to candidates for elections. When the debate resurfaced in the beginning
of the 1990s, in part, thanks to a European network of experts on gender balance in decision-
making and the inﬂuence of international norms following the Beijing conference, French
parity activists faced tremendous opposition. However, and surprisingly for many observers,
this strong opposition from the power elite and the CC was overcome after a decade of activism.
The context and factors that helped reverse the situation are now well known;6 it is sufﬁcient to
note here that when the socialist Party unexpectedly came back to power in 1997, the moment was
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ﬁnally ripe for a revision of the Constitution in order to unlock the 15-years long constitutional
freeze on quotas. The presence of a left-wing majority in the Assembly and the support of the
Senate president, Christian Poncelet, combined with the personal support of the Prime Minister
Lionel Jospin to the cause meant that a constitutional revision, which requires a majority of
three-ﬁfth of both chambers, could pass, which it did quite unanimously.
What was gained from the constitutional revision? Article 3 of the Constitution was changed
to include the following sentence:7 “the law promotes women’s and men’s equal access to elec-
toral mandates and elective functions.” The placement of this sentence in Article 3, that deﬁnes
national sovereignty, is a direct consequence of, and a direct response to, the framing of the debate
by the CC in terms of sovereignty. A revision to Article 4 adds that political parties must contrib-
ute to this objective. In 2000, several laws deﬁned more precisely the parameters of the implemen-
tation of this new constitutional principle.8 The debate was, again, heated in the Parliament,
testifying that despite the symbolic constitutional victory, resistance to quotas was still active
from both the right- and the left-wing of the political spectrum (Lépinard 2007).9
The dominant narrative of the 1999 constitutional reform is one of breaking the rule against
quotas and trying to impose a new one: the parity principle. Indeed, like in other countries such as
Portugal or Italy where a constitutional change was necessary to adopt gender quotas, opposition
to parity, in line with the CC 1982 decision, was voiced in the name of preserving the integrity of
the constitutional principle of equality (Rodriguez Ruiz and Rubio Marin 2008). This opposition
on normative and legal grounds encouraged parity activists to place their claim on high normative
grounds as well. Whereas in international texts, gender quotas are deﬁned as temporary special
measures and exceptions to the legal norm of formal equality, French parity was always
framed as a normative principle with no term limit (Rosenblum 2006; Lépinard 2007, 2013).
Moreover, although the focus had been clearly to “improve” and “perfect” French democracy
by adding to it the principle of parity, this principle could be expanded outside the realm of poli-
tics to other decision-making bodies as pioneer parity activist Gisèle Halimi noted early on
(Halimi 1998). In fact, parity represented an opportunity to reframe demands for gender equality,
to claim new measures for women’s rights. Hence, parity introduced both a legal change, as posi-
tive action measure for women were for the ﬁrst time constitutionally legitimized, and a semantic
change, from equality to parity which actually opened up new venues to elaborate new claims. At
the end of a decade of intense activism, the adoption of parity operated a shift in the normative and
legal ground of the debate on gender quotas in France. This ﬁrst component of a support structure
in favor of gender quotas – a new legal provision, a discursive innovation – was complemented
by the creation of WPAs devoted to the promotion and monitoring of parity, to which I now
turn.
Entrenching parity inside institutions
In the decade following the victorious campaign for the constitutional revision, the principle of
parity became a new way to frame demands for equality, and was more clearly adopted by femo-
crats and French WPAs as a part of their toolkit or “grammar” for action (Bereni and Revillard
2007). I argue that this adoption of the parity motto was made possible by the creation of a
strong support structure (Epp 1998) in favor of parity and by the political activism of key
players in that structure. Indeed, in the 1990s, the WPAs already in place in the French central
administration (the Service des droits des femmes, SDFE10) did not take a stand on the parity
issue, which seemed to fall outside of the scope of their mandate, traditionally focused on
themes such as equal pay or violence against women (Baudino 2005; Bereni and Revillard
2007). However, the creation of the Observatory of Parity changed the institutional landscape
of WPAs in France.
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In 1995, parity activists asked presidential candidates to take position on the parity issue
during the presidential campaign. The vast majority of candidates, eager not to lose women’s
votes, took a positive stance on the issue. This led the newly elected president, Jacques Chirac,
from right-wing party RPR, to create as a token of good faith and follow-up on his promise
made for the Beijing UN conference on women, a small governmental institution: the Observa-
tory of Parity (Observatoire de la parité), mandated to give expertise and advice on this topic to
the government. Key female politicians and feminist activists appointed in 1995 by the right-wing
government to the newly created Observatory of Parity helped keep the debate alive and produced
the ﬁrst ofﬁcial report devoted to the issue of parity in 1996 (Halimi 1998). While for the ﬁrst two
years the Observatory was ﬁrst and foremost a platform for the parity movement, collecting data
on gender gaps and developing pro-parity arguments and disseminating them to parliamentarians,
in 1997, its powers were extended to give recommendation on potential bills and legislative
reforms to improve women’s presence in decision-making (Baudino 2005).
Once the parity laws were passed, the Observatory became the ofﬁcial monitoring body for
the implementation of the laws, compiling data and producing expertise after each round of elec-
tions on how to improve the laws and their implementation. During the ﬁrst half of the 2000s, this
new support structure, the Observatory and the legislative delegations for women’s rights created
in 1999, helped reduce backlash against the 2000 law and deepen its reach in the political domain
and beyond. For example, the right-wing majority passed electoral reforms in 2003, with the
direct effect of reducing the scope of the parity laws for senatorial, regional and European elec-
tions. Indeed, while deputies introduced a strict “zipper” system for candidate lists for senators
elected with a proportional representation system, electoral reforms reduced the number of sena-
tors elected with such a system.11 Similarly, the government and its parliamentary majority intro-
duced smaller districts for both European and regional elections, with the predictable effect of
limiting the impact of the parity requirement.12
However, parity activists inside political institutions did not witness those attempts to curb the
parity reform and its disappointing implementation for the National Assembly (elected with a
uninominal system) without taking action. Quite the contrary, under the tenure of Marie-Jo
Zimmermann – a right-wing MP close to President Chirac – from 2002 to 2009, and despite a
right-wing majority in both chambers, the Observatory helped craft several pieces of legislation
to improve the efﬁcacy of the parity laws. In 2003, the placement mandate was tightened with a
zipper system (instead of three women every six candidates) for all proportional elections. In
2007, a law to promote women and men’s equal access to electoral mandate and elective func-
tions13 was passed. It extended parity to executive functions in regional and municipal councils
(in cities over 3500 inhabitants) and increased the ﬁnancial penalty for political parties that would
not apply parity for legislative elections. Finally, this law also imposed a “mix ticket” for unin-
ominal elections (legislative and cantonales): the substitute should be of the opposite sex of
the candidate. Others bills were also proposed to improve the implementation of parity. For
example on 20 May 2010, then-General Rapporteur of the Observatory, Chantal Brunel, proposed
a bill (no. 2529) to “promote women’s and men’s equal access to electoral mandates with a unin-
ominal majoritarian mode of election.” These failed attempts testify to the continuing activism on
the issue of political parity inside governmental and legislative institutions devoted to parity.
Another interesting way in which the Observatory of Parity tried to prevent setbacks in the
implementation of the parity laws was by providing prospective knowledge on how certain
changes in the electoral system would adversely affect the representation of women. For
example, when Nicolas Sarkozy, then-President of the Republic, proposed a bill in 2011 to sup-
press two important local elective mandates (local counselors and regional counselors) and blend
them into only one mandate of “territorial counselors” mostly elected through uninominal
majority system (rather than proportional list system), the Observatory provided an assessment
6 E. Lépinard
230
235
240
245
250
255
260
265
270
of the number of women that would probably be elected under such a new electoral system,
showing how women’s presence would drastically decrease. It provided these numbers for
each French department, comparing each time with the current number of elected women.14
During all these legislative processes, the support structure institutionalizing parity was a key
actor ﬁrst, thanks to its expertise: gathering data, issuing reports on how parity was implemented
and pointing to loopholes and problems in the current legislation.15 A second important feature
was that members of the Observatory were also MPs and networked with other WPAs to
create momentum during electoral reforms. The fact that Marie-Jo Zimmermann headed both
the Observatory and the National Assembly delegation for women’s rights from 2002 to 2009
also enabled a close working relationship and a relaying of the Observatory’s concerns in the leg-
islative arena. While activist networks such as Elles Aussi continued to lobby, to issue press
releases, to organize conferences and training sessions for female representatives, their impact
on the public debate and on the legislative process was minimal compared to the impact of the
expertise, lobby and networking from the Observatory and its key players.
As the socialists came back to power in 2012, some electoral reforms long called for by parity
activists ﬁnally took shape and electoral parity was further entrenched in the French political
system. In 2013, an electoral law16 changed the way local counselors (conseillers départemen-
taux) are elected in order to impose parity. It introduced a real “mix ticket”: one man/one
woman on the ballot, both candidates, and coupled circumscriptions together in order to maintain
the same number of representatives. This electoral reform also aligned cities over 1000 inhabi-
tants on the same mode of election as cities over 3500 inhabitants (a proportional list system,
allowing a strict parity to be applied to candidate lists). Parity was also applied to EPCIs (établis-
sements publics de cooperation intercommunale), an important type of indirectly elected local
political institution reuniting several cities that had been so far left out of the scope of the
parity reform that local power, and local men, had relocated there (Lépinard 2006). Then,
another electoral law re-introduced a proportional list system to elect senators in districts with
three or more senators.17 Finally, in 2014, an important piece of legislation tightened the condition
for elected representatives to hold several mandates at the same time, thereby opening new pos-
itions in the political system.18
All in all, reforms asked for by parity activists during this period were swiftly adopted and
setbacks inﬂicted under right-wing government were ﬁnally overturned. Despite the fact that
the process was not linear and that resistance was always present, especially when the right
was in power, the incremental process of entrenching and expanding parity – improving its
reach and efﬁciency – from within institutions is quite similar to what has been observed in
many Latin American countries (Piscopo 2015).
Endogenization and diffusion: quotas for corporate boards
The parity motto emerged as French feminist activists networked at the European level and pro-
duced expertise on women’s participation in decision-making that proved to be crucial in their
national crusade. This typical boomerang effect (Keck and Sikkink 1998) and important activist
mobilization characterized the early 1990s and the emergence of the parity claim but did not last
beyond this ﬁrst phase. Instead, the parity claim and the idea of gender quotas as tools to reach
equality developed, thanks to the institutional support structure, and generated new venues and
new advances, with fewer references to and no support from international or European institutions
and only weak civil society mobilization. Diffusion from politics to other domains therefore
appears as a process endogenous to institutions in which WPAs play a central role.
The Observatory of Parity was a key player in the support structure that helped to diffuse
gender quotas beyond electoral politics, thanks to two important institutional features. First,
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the fact that members of the Observatory also held positions in other ministries or in the SDFE
meant that they could transfer the tool of gender quotas as the best means to redress inequalities
to other spheres. The fact than many members were also MPs meant that they could launch the
debate and present initiatives at the parliamentary level if necessary (Ressot 2013, 186).19 Second,
the fact that the Observatory’s mission was not conﬁned to politics but included from 1998
onwards20 a larger mandate made it a legitimate institution to intervene in debates on pension
reform, violence against women or quotas in public service (Ressot 2013). As Catherine Génis-
son, Generale Rapporteure of the Observatory from 1999 to 2002 stated in the 2002 Observatory’s
report: “the parity law is a major law, it is meant to develop in the whole society a parity culture, in
politics but also in other domains, in particular in the social and economic spheres.” This diffusion
of the parity agenda was made possible, in part, thanks to the Observatory’s members’ networks in
other institutions. For example, members of the Observatory’s council Françoise Milewski and
Annie Junter participated in the Committee in charge of gender equality in the public adminis-
tration headed by Anicet LePors in 2002. As the title of the second report issued in 2003 by
the commission on women’s access to management positions in the public service, “Promoting
the parity logic,”21 suggests members of the Observatory transferred to this new ﬁeld of public
policy the idea that gender quotas should also be used to promote women’s access to top positions
in public service.
The story of the push for CBQs, and of their adoption in 2011, brings evidence of the process
by which gender quotas were diffused, thanks to the support structure, to the economic sphere.
Although the debate on CBQ existed in other European countries at the time (Oliveira and
Gondek 2014) both the inspiration for the bill and the process to adopt it are endogenous to
French institutions rather than a foreign import. While the Norwegian CBQ logically appears
as an example in some parliamentary reports,22 these references do not amount to a policy trans-
fer: no expert network was mobilized, no clear transfer of expertise was realized beyond one short
visit to Norway by Marie-Jo Zimmermann. Besides, organizations concerned with political parity
did not mobilize on the CBQ legal reforms. Only after the law passed did organizations of
women’s accountants or women’s board members (such as the AFECA23) develop and launch
networking initiatives with academics in business schools and training for women’s board
members. Finally, the development of antidiscrimination legislation in the 2000s and the rise
of diversity discourse in the private sector did not put CBQ on the political agenda. Quite the con-
trary, the diversity charter adopted in 2004, and the various private initiatives developed in the
2000s were based on voluntary actions and never proposed a constraining CBQ as one of the
tools to improve diversity (Bereni 2009). If diversity appears today as a rationale used by
actors in the private sector to legitimize CBQ, it is a retrospective rationale to accommodate a
measure once perceived as a governmental intrusion in businesses’ freedom to nominate whom-
ever they want as board members.
Hence, the policy impetus for CBQ came from inside the support structure, in particular in the
person of Marie-Jo Zimmermann, as General Rapporteur of the Observatory of Parity and of the
National Assembly’s delegation for women’s rights. Aside from her one-day ﬁeldtrip to Norway,
the process of adoption of CBQ does not involve networking across Europe (as political parity
did) or references to European or international soft law or incentive. As she stated herself in an
interview:
Q: Did you beneﬁt from any European inﬂuence?
M-J Z: No, absolutely not. I had as my ambition that France should be the model.24
In 2005, the then-Minister for parity and gender equality at work, Nicole Ameline, proposed a
bill on égalité professionnelle, that is, equal pay and gender equality at work.25 The bill mentioned
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women’s presence on boards and the need to reach a gender balance within a ﬁve-year period, but
did not say how this was to be accomplished. Marie-Jo Zimmermann proposed several amend-
ments to the bill to include a limit of 80% of members of the same sex on corporate boards as
well as on commissions representing workers in the public sector and supervisory boards of
public institutions. The gender gap was to be reduced within 5 years, however the bill and the
law ﬁnally adopted (including Zimmermann’s 20% quotas) did not deﬁne any sanction for
non-compliance. Despite an agreement reached in the National Assembly and the Senate on
the use of a 20% quota,26 the CC struck down the quota provision. Indeed, 60 deputies referred
the law to the CC on procedural grounds (they did not mention the quota provision), but the CC
decided to examine the quota provision on its own initiative and, unsurprisingly given its histori-
cal commitment against quotas, struck down the provision using a narrow interpretation of the
1999 constitutional amendment that excluded from its scope non-political elected functions
and mandates.27 Mobilization from within the WPA, in this case, in particular, the Observatory,
thus met with resistance from another institution, the CC in charge of the legal entrenchment and
legitimization of gender quotas.
A constitutional reform was, once again, needed to implement gender quotas. The 2008 con-
stitutional revision planned by President Sarkozy to modernize political institutions gave Marie-
Jo Zimmermann the window of opportunity she was looking for. Advised by an important ﬁgure
of her own party, Simone Veil,28 and despite Sarkozy’s opposition, Marie-Jo Zimmermann pro-
posed an amendment to Article 3 to enlarge the constitutional commitment to promoting women’s
equal access to electoral mandate to “professional functions.” However, the ﬁght was not so easy
to win. Indeed, she was going against her own political party since the President, under pressure
from organized business representatives, had decided he did not want any constitutional revision
on the CBQ issue and wanted rather to add a provision on gender equality in the Preamble of the
constitution (therefore with no legally binding effect).
The battle for the constitutional revision, to add professional responsibilities to Article 3 of the
Constitution, repeated the arguments already rehearsed in 1999 but in a minor mode. Opposition
was now concentrated in the right-wing Senate and Marie-Jo Zimmermann, who witnessed the
senate debate from the public gallery used “shaming” tactics with the press on her side to pressure
senators to vote her amendment.29 Arguments already developed to oppose political parity in
the name of a formal conception of equality were again brought out but with very little
effect. The idea voiced by some senators that “only individuals are bearers of equal rights” and
that “the Republic ignores groups that, by their nature, would introduce discrimination”30 was
replaced by more pragmatic arguments about the diversity in abilities and backgrounds women
would bring to corporation.31
In the name of pragmatism, in the year following, the constitutional revision Marie-Jo
Zimmermann along with Brigitte Grésy, former head of the SDFE and author of a report
on equal pay in 2009,32 proposed in the ﬁrst bill proposal of what would became the 2011 Copé-
Zimmermann CBQ law33 that parity be replaced by a 40% quota.34 This shift shows that as
gender quotas were diffused to the economic sphere the initial normative argument to entrench
this new deﬁnition of equality in the legal order gave way to a more pragmatic assessment of
quotas’ efﬁciency as a tool in the gender equality policy toolbox, and testiﬁes that the legal and
normative grounds were indeed different in 2009 than a decade earlier.
The diffusion of gender quotas did not stop at corporate boards – a year later in 2012, the “loi
Sauvadet” imposed a 40% public bodies gender quota (PBQ) for higher public service functions
to be reached by 2018, thanks to the lobbying of two deputies, Françoise Guégot and Marie-Jo
Zimmermann. This quota also applies to administrative and supervisory boards of public insti-
tutions, high councils, juries, and selection committees in public service procedures.35 Again,
this process was top-down, endogenous to the Parliament and the executive bureaucracy, with
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scarce public debate on the quota measure, little publicity in the media, and no opposition to the
quota scheme.
Hence, the 2011 CBQ law and the 2012 PBQ law, contrary to the electoral parity laws, are the
results of a top-down process, in great part made possible by the support structure created as a
response to the political activism of the 1990s for political parity. Their adoption testiﬁes to
the diffusion of the parity principle beyond electoral politics, and of the diffusion of a simple
and efﬁcient tool to implement it: gender quotas.
Further institutionalization, diffusion, and routinization
In 2013, with the left ﬁnally back to power, parity was further legally entrenched and diffused: one
new law extended the parity principle to elected and nominated bodies in universities36 and two
others deepened parity in electoral politics.37 Parity was also further institutionally entrenched.
Socialist President François Hollande closed down the Observatory in order to create the Haut
Conseil à l’égalité entre les femmes et les hommes, (High Council for Equality between
women and men – HCEfh). Still a parallel structure to the administrative bureaucracy in
charge of women’s rights, the HCEfh has a broader mission and an extended staff38 compared
to the previous Observatory. Among its members are high civil servants in charge of gender
equality in each ministry, as a way to mainstream gender equality in the executive bureaucracy.
Sanctioning the progressive enlargement of the Observatory’s mission and policy interests that
took place during the 2000s, parity is now only one of the ﬁve policy ﬁelds covered by the
HCEfh (along with gender stereotypes, international, health and reproductive rights, and
gender violence). The HCEfh, like the other WPAs, has been charged with the mandate to
provide impact studies on pieces of legislation with a gender dimension.39 It can also provide,
upon request by the Prime Minister or the Minister in charge of women’s rights, opinions on
bills that are under scrutiny in the Parliament. 40 This ex-ante procedure allows femocrats
within the HCEfh to mainstream gender quotas in other domains by proposing amendments
adding gender quotas. For example, as a consequence of the opinion released by the HCEfh,41
the 2013 law reforming higher education also included provisions to promote parity in university
decision-making bodies and representative bodies.42
The HCEfh also delivered an impact study, prior to parliamentary discussions, on the 2014 bill
on “real equality between women and men,”43 which devotes a whole section to “Generalizing the
constitutional objective of parity.” The law itself follows these incentives and addresses domains
where parity should be implemented (or better implemented) in politics, such as legislative elec-
tions and in inter-communal structures, but mainly outside politics in the public domain, such as
chambers of commerce, agriculture, and industry, as well as the private domain such as sports
organizations. Finally, the HCEfh’s opinion on the 2014 equality bill identiﬁes other domains
to which quotas and the parity principle could be applied in the future, such as unions, NGOs,
and political parties. Hence, virtually every public or professional institution or organization
has become a potential site of gender-quota implementation.
These proposals to disseminate gender-quota mechanisms way beyond politics or corporate
boards did not meet any opposition, quite the contrary, parity and gender quotas seem to have
become unproblematic. As the Secretary General of the HCEfh stated when asked about possible
opposition to the idea of using gender quotas to reach equality:
Q: So numbered targets are now generalized? After so much resistance are they now
accepted as a means to reach an objective?
A: In the political discourse the evolution during debates at the National Assembly is clear,
for the last law nobody batted an eyelid (… ) there is always some resistance in the
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Senate on quotas… they say they agree with the concept of parity because anyway it has
become politically incorrect to be against parity (… ) but they always ﬁnd ways to try to
suppress quotas, but at the National Assembly (… ) it’s now part of the tools. We used
to hear that France is indivisible and all this discourse against positive discrimination,
temporary special measures… and we don’t hear that anymore, which is funny
because it was legally very entrenched and now it’s gone.”44
Echoing this statement, the term parity was recently included in the body of a legal text for the
ﬁrst time (and not in the exposé des motifs of the bill, i.e., the political rationale that precedes the
legal text itself): the 2013 law on higher education mentions explicitly in several of its provisions
the word parity. The same goes for the 2014 equality law, of which one of its titles reads “applying
the constitutional principle of parity.” This trend mirrors the political will of the HCEfh to see the
parity principle more clearly deﬁned and identiﬁed as a principle of equal sharing of power and of
representation between men and women, a “common referential principle identiﬁable by all actors
and adapted for each sector [of social and economic life].”45 Once banned as un-republican, un-
French, and radically different from parity, quotas are now presented in a very different light by
the HCEfh:
Quotas are legal and legitimate in the name of a coherent republican universalism. Quotas are
not preferential measures but corrective and transformative measures that aim at undoing struc-
tural barriers, which are incompatible with the principle of equality.46
Quotas have thus been successfully diffused to almost all decision-making bodies in the econ-
omic sphere (CBQ and professional organizations), in the public sphere (public bodies from min-
istry to advisory boards, university juries, and hospital management), and in the social sphere
(sport federations). This diffusion of gender quotas clearly bears the mark of the HCEfh and
no trace of NGO activism or external inﬂuence from European institutions.
Conclusion
Once a measure depicted as a foreign import and hotly debated in the public sphere, gender quotas
have become a legitimate and unproblematic means to redress gender imbalance, and conse-
quently have receded to the margins of the public debate. The French case shows that the
dynamics of gender quotas’ diffusion differ from the dynamics of gender quotas’ adoption in
the political realm. The 1999–2000 reform was clearly the product of a wide mobilization,
allying various women’s organizations that had not previously been allied in any type of coalition,
mobilizing female politicians and using norms and discourses from the European level. By con-
trast, the diffusion of gender quotas was made possible, thanks to the institutionalization of parity
within various bureaucratic structures. The process of diffusion was mostly endogenous to French
political institutions and much less controversial than the initial adoption of quotas. As quotas
became a routinized tool, the left/right divide on this issue has tended to fade and opposition
in parliamentary debates has become less and less vocal. The Senate and the CC have remained
opposed to quotas. However, this lack of support did not prove unsurpassable: it delayed the
adoption and diffusion process but still constitutional amendments and new legislations were
passed under both right-wing and left-wing parliamentary majorities.
These differences between the phase of adoption and the phase of diffusion, and the unex-
pected success of gender quotas in France can be expected as the normative and legal ground
shifted once the ﬁrst parity reform was adopted. However, adoption does not automatically
entail widespread diffusion of gender quotas to other domains. In fact, while many countries
have adopted electoral quotas, few have witnessed such an extensive diffusion of this mechanism
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in public policy. This diffusion can mostly be explained by the institutional entrenchment of parity
in successive WPAs devoted to the issue, ﬁrst the Observatory and then the HCEfh. Each insti-
tution acted as an efﬁcient support structure, providing expertise, prospective knowledge and
vehement criticism of attempts at backpedalling political parity through electoral reforms. In a
typical policy transfer process, crucial entrepreneurs in those structures, and the simplicity of
the tool to be transferred, contributed to the diffusion of quotas from electoral politics to other
domains of decision-making. Hence, while literature on WPAs has shown that they can relay
women’s movements claims (or water them down), and prevent retrenchment of women’s
rights, the French case shows that, under the leadership of key political players, they can act
autonomously to entrench and expand gender quotas.
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Notes
1. On the French idiosyncratic “Republican” opposition to gender quotas, see Bereni and Lépinard
(2004), Scott (2005), Lépinard (2007), Lépinard and Mazur (2009), on opposition to gendered policies
see Mazur (2001), and on the related opposition to group recognition and afﬁrmative action policies
see for example Calvès 2002 and Sabbagh and Peer (2008).
2. The Vallaud-Belkacem bill on ‘real equality’ adopted on 23 July 2014.
3. Its detractors referred to these measures at the time (and still today) as ‘positive discrimination’ in order
to discredit attempts at implementing positive action measures in favor of any group.
4. Several scholars have analyzed the ﬁrst rounds of gender quotas implementation in French politics and
concluded that they were not as efﬁcient as was expected (see Achin et al. 2007 and for an updated and
more optimist assessment, see Murray 2012). However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate
gender quota’s impact in terms of bringing concrete gender equality and whether or not they constitute
yet another form of symbolic reform in France (see Mazur 1996).
5. Decision no. 82 146 DC 18 November 1982.
6. For a review of the research on the parity reform, see Bereni (2015, 13–14).
7. Constitutional Law no. 99–569 8 July 1999 relative à l’égalité entre les femmes et les hommes.
8. Law no. 2000-493 6 June 2000 and Law no. 2000-641 10 July 2000.
9. Right-wing deputies tried to curtail every innovation introduced by the reform, especially electoral
reforms, with the tacit agreement of many left-wing deputies. For example, despite intense controversy
the attempt to implement parity in cities over 2500 inhabitants did not pass, and parity was
implemented only in cities over 3500 inhabitants in which elections follow a closed proportional
list system.
10. This bureaucratic structure created in 1985 is always afﬁliated to a broader ministry (such as social
affairs) or with a speciﬁc political leadership such as a minister or an under-secretary of State depend-
ing on the government in power, socialists tending to provide women’s rights with a speciﬁc minister-
ial portfolio and right-wing governments tending to subsume it under social affairs.
11. Law no. 2003-697 30 July 2003.
12. Law no. 2003-327 11 April 2003.
13. Law no. 2007-128 31 January 2007.
14. Observatoire de la Parité entre les femmes et les hommes, impact study 2014, accessed online at http://
www.haut-conseil-egalite.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/OPFH_RT2014_projectionsratios.pdf.
15. Starting in 2002, after each election cycle, the Observatory issued reports on the implementation of
parity, and for each parliamentary initiative to reform the electoral system, the parliamentary
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delegations for women’s rights as well as the Observatory issued reports indicating the potential effects
of those reforms on women’s equal access to political ofﬁce. See http://www.haut-conseil-egalite.gouv.
fr/parite/rapports-institutionnels-40/
16. Law no. 2013-403 17 May 2013.
17. Law no. 2013-702 2 August 2013.
18. Organic Law 14 February 2014.
19. Marie-Jo Zimmermann, who headed the Observatory from 2002 to 2009, decided that the chairs of the
Parliamentary delegations for women’s rights in the National Assembly, the Senate and the Social and
Economic Council should be systematically members of the Observatory, and in 2011 the relationships
between the Observatory and the SDFE were strengthened with a convention to exchange good prac-
tices and expertise and make initiatives more visible. During this period no less than 14 deputies and/or
senators were members of the Observatory.
20. Decree no. 98-922 14 October 1998.
21. The report was co-authored by Milewski and Le Pors.
22. See Report from the law commission no. 2205, 2009, 23.
23. Association des femmes diplômées expertise comptable et administrateurs.
24. Interview of Marie-Jo Zimmermann with the author 11 June 2014.
25. Bill project 2214, registered 24 March 2005.
26. Law no. 2006-340 23 March 2006 on equal pay between women and men.
27. Decision no. 2006-533 DC 16 March 2006.
28. Famously known for defending the law decriminalizing abortion in France, the “loi Veil” of 1975.
29. Interview of Marie-Jo Zimmermann with the author 11 June 2014.
30. Muguette Dini (UDI right wing party), Senate debates, 18 June 2008, 2926.
31. Although deputies might share with private actors a diversity discourse that emphasizes economic per-
formance (Sénac 2010), it should be noted that the latter strongly opposed the idea of constraining
measures to reach this diversity goal.
32. Grésy, Brigitte, Rapport préparatoire à la concertation avec les partenaires sociaux sur l’égalité profes-
sionnelle entre les femmes et les hommes, juillet 2009.
33. The 2011 Copé-Zimmermann law implements a two-step quota of 20% by 2014 and 40% by 2017 for
board members of publicly listed companies, as well as unlisted companies which have more than 500
workers and average revenues or total assets of more than 50 million euros during the last three con-
secutive years. It also applies to some state-owned companies. Boards with member appointments that
do not respect the quota are considered null and board members’ beneﬁts can be suspended.
34. Report from the law commission no. 2205, 2009, 30.
35. Law no. 2012-347 12 March 2012.
36. ‘Fioraso’ Law of 22 July 2013.
37. Law of 17 May 2013 reforming the electoral system for departmental elections, law of 2 August 2013
reforming the Senate’s elections.
38. Although still minimalist: now three full-time persons are employed rather than the two of the Obser-
vatory. The members are more numerous, over 70, when the Observatory had less than 40.
39. Circular from the PrimeMinister, 23 August 2012 “relative à la prise en compte dans la préparation des
textes législatifs et réglementaires de leur impact en termes d’égalité entre les femmes et les hommes.”
40. Decree no. 2013-8 3 January 2013.
41. Avis no. 2013-0514-PAR-002.
42. Law no. 2013-660 22 July 2013 on higher education and research.
43. Impact Study, NOR: DFEX1313602L/Bleue-1, 1 July 2014. Law 2014-873 of 4 August 2014.
44. Interview with Caroline Ressot, 11 June 2014.
45. Interview with Caroline Ressot, 11 June 2014, p. 51.
46. Haut Conseil à l’Egalité entre les femmes et les hommes, Avis sur le projet de loi pour l’égalité entre
les femmes et les hommes, Avis no. 2013-0912-HCE-007, 49.
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